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[Excerpt] Decisions about the constitution of workers' rights do not unfold in a vacuum; quite the 
opposite. History plays an important role. Legislators, judges, policymakers, and other key decision-
makers possess different value systems that they transpose onto various institutional practices. Ideas 
and the value systems that certain ideas represent are shared, adopted and at times imposed across 
national borders. Globally, particular labor and social policy models are exchanged and advocated. The 
International Labor Organization has since 1919 gathered delegates from around the world to discuss 
and adopt international conventions on particular labor and employment policies. These norms as ideas 
shape national and local choices and strategies for protecting workers' rights. The international human 
rights treaty system is yet another international venue for the advocacy, negotiation, and setting of labor 
and employment rights standards. 
Taken together, the decisions made in establishing citizenship rights at work—their underlying values and 
moral paradigms, their real world effectiveness on the ground where people work, and the history and 
politics behind their development—form an important object of study for both the citizen-worker and the 
labor scholar. This book is an in-depth examination of a narrow but essential citizenship right at the 
workplace, the rights of workers to refuse unsafe, hazardous, or unhealthy work. The employment 
relationship in all its divergent and precarious forms is a global phenomenon. Studying how employees 
are empowered to dissent and the models of protection on the right to refuse is, therefore, a question of 
international importance. 
Across the contemporary globalized workplace, a "right to refuse" is exercised when one or more workers 
decide not to perform some task or assignment at work for fear of a health and safety risk—even after 
being ordered to do the job by a supervisor, manager, or some other superior. Where such refusals are 
safeguarded effectively, there are systems of protections for the worker with avenues for redress. These 
may include legal protections against retaliation or discrimination and systems to ameliorate the workers' 
health and safety concern. Where refusal rights are not well protected, this book asks why this is so. The 
diverging ways this unique citizenship right has been respected, exercised, and protected in law and in 
practice is the focus of this book. It is the story of how human society has shaped and restricted the 
global norms that define the workers' right to protest and in turn how society defines social justice and 
human rights in the struggle for a healthy and safe work environment. 
The story of "the right to refuse" moves back and forth from local grievance to international political 
negotiation. The diversity of questions raised by this subject are equally legal, political, economic, social, 
and indeed philosophic. Refusal rights strike at the heart of employment in a capitalist society, defining 
how workers are protected when they fear for their health and safety. This book is about how society has 
decided to treat people willing to risk their livelihood to protest a concern about their basic working 
environment. The issue is not an abstract legal debate but rather a series of poignant and unnerving 
human experiences. The choices made define social justice, determine the degree of risk faced by people 
and communities, and delineate the line between a dignified and undignified human existence. Attention 
is paid to the North American experience for the instructive qualities of its labor history but also because 
this experience has influenced the global norms. This book is the history of the right to refuse unsafe 
work under international labor standards, a global legal framework and jurisprudence that fails workers 
seeking social justice by refusing unsafe work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Commodified Workers and 
the International Response 
Colonel Nicholson had again reassured his Japanese captors that the 
British soldiers under his command could construct their railroad bridge 
before the deadline. In the classic World War II film Bridge on the River 
Kwai, the exacting commander touts the organizational efficiency of his 
captive battalion, eventually beaming at the sight of the bridge as it nears 
completion. Hesitantly, near the end of the enormous construction project 
crafted entirely from jungle lumber, a young major approaches Nicholson 
and dissents, saying the soldiers—now Japanese prisoners of war—must 
be given permission to slow down or openly revolt, given the importance 
of the railroad bridge to enemy supply lines. Nicholson immediately snaps, 
indignant at the thought of any insubordination. Glancing at the massive 
structure he thunders in all his sweaty servitude, "We are prisoners of war! 
We haven't the right to refuse work!" 
Even in the absence of barbed wire and the pointed rifle of a prison 
camp, millions of workers around the world are averse to raising one's 
voice at work, let alone using open resistance such as refusing unsafe work. 
2 Introduction 
The prospect of meaningful improvement of working conditions seems 
so unlikely that the common suggestion for action is "Find another job!" 
rather than challenging management, asking questions, raising concerns, 
or stopping work. On the surface, "find another job!" may be a wise choice, 
if a person can find other employment. From a global policy viewpoint, 
however, there are fundamental drawbacks to this defeatist path of action. 
Whether in economics textbooks or neighborhood cafes, people often 
erroneously see work as unfolding in a simple labor market where buyers 
and sellers exchange human labor and work for a price. Each government, 
however, constructs, shapes, and institutionalizes systems of labor and 
employment. Societies define different boundaries for rights at work and 
determine how workers can struggle to achieve social justice. Decisions of 
this nature encompass a variety of constitutions of the right of employees to 
dissent and struggle to improve their working environment. These issues 
relate closely to the protection of the freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. Occupational health and safety laws also define these boundar-
ies. Each of these labor rights institutions shapes work and employment, 
making "labor markets" more a function of deliberately organized laws, 
habits and practices rather than the free-for-all open exchange that a "mar-
ket" metaphor implies. 
When workers are resigned to "find another job!" as the only option, 
both workers and societies ultimately lose. What is lost is the exercise 
of basic citizenship rights at the workplace. Citizenship, as I use it here, 
means not the traditional status granted by a government but rather the act 
of possessing certain inalienable rights and privileges that make possible 
real participation and representation in the governance of society. Workers 
have rights that are to be exercised and enjoyed, making each workplace 
a site of citizenship and government in a free society. When workers quit 
their jobs because they feel they have no other choice, society loses a degree 
of freedom and an avenue for voice, representation, and governance in the 
workplace. Taking a strict "labor market" view thus marginalizes notions 
of citizenship rights at work and undermines the basic idea of freedom, 
democracy, and fundamental human rights at the workplace. Such advice 
is akin to being told to "move to another country!" rather than struggle for 
social change. 
If workers, conversely, disregard the all too common advice to "find 
another job!" and exercise citizenship rights at work, a particular set of 
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problems immediately surfaces. Will society's labor and employment sys-
tem offer protection? Will changes be made to correct the original prob-
lem? If the problem is a safety and health concern, government inspectors 
may be called upon to enforce specific regulations. Will those regulations 
be enough? What regulations apply? What happens after the health and 
safety inspector leaves? If I try to organize to push my concern, will I be 
fired? If we all cause too much "trouble" will the company close and move 
elsewhere? Each of these uncertainties raises key questions about the 
boundaries of workers' rights and the distribution of power in the gover-
nance of the workplace. The answers are an indication of how each society 
defines and shapes the role of workers as citizens.1 
Decisions about the constitution of workers' rights do not unfold in a 
vacuum; quite the opposite. History plays an important role. Legislators, 
judges, policymakers, and other key decision-makers possess different 
value systems that they transpose onto various institutional practices. Ideas 
and the value systems that certain ideas represent are shared, adopted and 
at times imposed across national borders. Globally, particular labor and so-
cial policy models are exchanged and advocated. The International Labor 
Organization has since 1919 gathered delegates from around the world to 
discuss and adopt international conventions on particular labor and em-
ployment policies. These norms as ideas shape national and local choices 
and strategies for protecting workers' rights. The international human 
rights treaty system is yet another international venue for the advocacy, 
negotiation, and setting of labor and employment rights standards. 
Taken together, the decisions made in establishing citizenship rights at 
work—their underlying values and moral paradigms, their real world ef-
fectiveness on the ground where people work, and the history and politics 
behind their development—form an important object of study for both 
the citizen-worker and the labor scholar. This book is an in-depth exami-
nation of a narrow but essential citizenship right at the workplace, the 
rights of workers to refuse unsafe, hazardous, or unhealthy work. The em-
ployment relationship in all its divergent and precarious forms is a global 
phenomenon. Studying how employees are empowered to dissent and the 
models of protection on the right to refuse is, therefore, a question of inter-
national importance. 
Across the contemporary globalized workplace, a "right to refuse" is 
exercised when one or more workers decide not to perform some task or 
4 Introduction 
assignment at work for fear of a health and safety risk—even after being 
ordered to do the job by a supervisor, manager, or some other superior. 
Where such refusals are safeguarded effectively, there are systems of pro-
tections for the worker with avenues for redress. These may include legal 
protections against retaliation or discrimination and systems to ameliorate 
the workers' health and safety concern. Where refusal rights are not well 
protected, this book asks why this is so. The diverging ways this unique 
citizenship right has been respected, exercised, and protected in law and in 
practice is the focus of this book. It is the story of how human society has 
shaped and restricted the global norms that define the workers' right to 
protest and in turn how society defines social justice and human rights in 
the struggle for a healthy and safe work environment. 
The story of "the right to refuse" moves back and forth from local 
grievance to international political negotiation. The diversity of questions 
raised by this subject are equally legal, political, economic, social, and in-
deed philosophic. Refusal rights strike at the heart of employment in a 
capitalist society, defining how workers are protected when they fear for 
their health and safety. This book is about how society has decided to treat 
people willing to risk their livelihood to protest a concern about their basic 
working environment. The issue is not an abstract legal debate but rather 
a series of poignant and unnerving human experiences. The choices made 
define social justice, determine the degree of risk faced by people and 
communities, and delineate the line between a dignified and undignified 
human existence. Attention is paid to the North American experience for 
the instructive qualities of its labor history but also because this experi-
ence has influenced the global norms. This book is the history of the right 
to refuse unsafe work under international labor standards, a global legal 
framework and jurisprudence that fails workers seeking social justice by 
refusing unsafe work. 
W h e n Workers Refuse Unsafe Work 
Duane Carlson was a cement truck operator employed by Arrowhead 
Concrete Works, a major concrete supplier in northeast Minnesota. When 
a mechanic and the company safety director verified his safety concerns 
about the truck he was driving, he refused to drive until repairs were made. 
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Court documents filed in his 2003 wrongful dismissal lawsuit attest to the 
pressure workers can face when they decide to refuse unsafe work. The 
company owner told him to "keep your mouth shut and do what you are 
told" because "you don't get to dictate demands to me. I tell you what to do 
or you get the hell out of here." When Carlson, a member of the Teamsters 
union, continued to refuse despite the threats, management's commands 
escalated into a full-throttled verbal assault. "Listen you little cocksucker," 
the owner screamed, "get in that truck right fucking now and get it ready. 
I am sick of your whining. Some fuckers are going down the road and get-
ting laid off. You're going to be the first one you son of a bitch."2 Carlson 
was not called back to work after a seasonal layoff and ultimately lost his 
discharge case in 2008 after five years of litigation and appeals. 
Minutes away on U.S. Interstate Highway 35, Deborah Scott had made 
a similar decision in a different kind of workplace, six years earlier. Scott 
refused a routine job assignment to a dialysis unit of the Miller-Dwan 
Medical Center in Duluth. She had been working with the chemical steril-
ant Renalin as a dialysis assistant. Told by the sales representatives of the 
company producing the chemical that it was so safe "you could practically 
drink it," she learned from another employee that exposure to the chemi-
cal should be avoided by pregnant women. Scott was six months preg-
nant and experiencing preterm labor. According to court documents in 
her health and safety retaliation case, three other dialysis technicians had 
also reported problems with their pregnancies while working with Ren-
alin. After Scott's obstetrician ordered her to avoid exposure, she refused 
to return to her job. Management placed her on "unpaid leave" during her 
pregnancy, forcing Scott's family into economic hardship.3 
Like Scott and Carlson, Richard Gizbert, an ABC News correspondent 
based in London, England, had a similar experience. Gizbert was fired 
after he refused to accept a third war zone assignment weeks before the 
Iraq War in 2003. Terminated despite a voluntary war zone policy, Giz-
bert sought £1.5 million for lost compensation with the Central London 
Employment Tribunal. He was awarded £98,781 after the tribunal found 
his dismissal unfair and based on his refusal to go to Iraq. ABC News 
appealed the decision, reducing the award to £60,000 while establishing 
jurisprudence under U.K. safety law that no right to refuse had occurred. 
"His place of work was London," said the tribunal. "He chose not to visit 
the war zones. He was thus in no danger, let alone imminent danger, nor 
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could he, in the circumstances, reasonably believe otherwise." Gizbert later 
found work reporting with the al-Jazeera network.4 
About five kilometers across the border from Trieste, Italy, is the Slo-
venian port of Luka Koper on the Adriatic Sea. Once operated as a so-
cially owned enterprise by a workers' council in the former Yugoslavia, the 
port would become one of the first free-trade zones years before the fall of 
the Soviet Union. Today, Luka Koper handles more than sixteen million 
tons of cargo annually and is an important logistics hub for the region. As 
traffic has increased with global trade, however, worker health and safety 
has become an important concern for the port workers. In August 2011, 
a small group of less than two dozen crane operators walked off the job 
to protest deteriorating working conditions. Individual contract workers, 
some reportedly on the job for several shifts in a row, wildcatted sporadi-
cally to protest "brutal growth in tonnage at the port" and "accidents hap-
pening almost every day." These refusals to work led to new health and 
safety protections in a collective agreement, including health and safety 
protections for some of the most precarious workers at Luka Koper.5 
China has become Africa's biggest trading partner, boosting employ-
ment and "providing more loans . . . to poor countries than the World 
Bank."6 As investment has grown, however, reports of hazardous work-
ing conditions have surfaced with workers facing retribution for refus-
ing unsafe work. Workers at the Chinese-owned Chambishi Copper Mine 
in Zambia told Human Rights Watch that they are routinely threatened 
for raising the prospect of refusing to work in unsafe areas. "Speak about 
safety, stop working—you're dismissed," say the managers, according 
to the underground miners. "I will say 'This is unsafe, we should not go 
ahead,' but the boss will say, 'No, go work,' and threaten to dismiss me. If 
you don't go along, you don't keep your job." Hazardous work has created 
the "mixed blessing" of employment in Africa.7 
As in Chambishi and Luka Koper, the question of refusing unsafe work 
is also faced by people working in illicit and unregulated occupations. Sex 
workers across Asia, for example, have campaigned for regulation and 
occupational health and safety, including the right to refuse unsafe sex.8 
One sex worker in Blackburn, Australia, a Melbourne suburb, was found 
assaulted by a man who "aggressively grabbed her, flipped her onto her 
back and attempted to rape her" before pulling a gun on her when she pro-
tested. The woman had "persistently refused to have sex with him without 
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a condom" and went on to file a claim for injured workers' compensation. 
Her lawyer argued "whether you work in a bank or a brothel, everyone 
has the right to feel safe and work."9 Like workers in other types of illegal 
employment, from child laborers to undocumented migrant labor, work-
ing in the underground economy compounds the challenge of protecting 
safety and health, including the right to refuse unsafe work. 
Workers in emergencies have also struggled to refuse. Kathleen Blanco, 
the governor of Louisiana, called in hundreds of National Guard troops 
"fresh back from Iraq" and granted shoot to kill authority to "restore order" 
in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.10 As tensions rose and 
people realized the magnitude of the disaster that displaced three hundred 
thousand residents and caused damages in excess of $100 billion, a crew 
of private security guards reported for duty at a fifty-one-story private of-
fice building downtown." The crew was ordered to take SWAT action to 
remove vandals said to be taking advantage of the electrical blackout. Con-
cerned about working in the tense environment, the employees requested 
more training and bulletproof vests. The crew was terminated on the spot 
for insubordination. Their wrongful discharge case was investigated by 
health and safety inspectors and was dismissed without merit.12 
Where work hazards stop and environmental hazards begin is not al-
ways clear. Testifying before a congressional committee investigating the 
Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico that killed 
eleven workers, Lamar McKay, chairman and president of BP America, 
argued all employees "anywhere at any level" had the ability "and, in fact, 
the responsibility to raise their hand and try to get the operations stopped." 
Steve Newman, president and CEO of Transocean, another company on 
the same rig, reiterated that all of the employees had "stop work author-
ity" to call "a time out for safety."13 This authority had failed, however. Ten 
hours before the explosion and ecologic disaster, an argument unfolded 
among the workers about safety. "The company man was basically saying, 
'well, this is how it's going to be'," Douglas Brown, a rig mechanic, told 
federal investigators.14 Similar attempts to refuse unsafe work were also 
reported in another of the world's worst industrial accidents, the Union 
Carbide leak of methyl isocyanate in Bhopal, India, in 1984.'5 
Reports of workers refusing work due to safety and health concerns 
are found around the world and across occupations. Teachers, agricultural 
workers, retail clerks, nurses, and truck drivers have refused work for 
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safety and health reasons. Prison guards have refused work due to inad-
equate staffing levels, workers at nuclear power plants have refused work 
due to production speedup, and airline pilots have refused to fly due to 
mechanical concerns. The right to refuse unsafe work has involved indi-
vidual work hazards, dangers to groups of workers, and risks to broader 
communities beyond the workplace. Work refusals for safety and health 
reasons may be isolated actions by one worker acting alone, or they may be 
group actions taken by any number of workers. 
Despite differences in the particular details, there are commonalities 
shared across all work refusals. When workers face a hazard as they see it, 
they encounter a critical decision. If avenues for the redress of grievances 
exist, the decision may not be difficult. Safety and health can be secured via 
institutional means at the workers' initiative. Where workers are afforded 
no role in governance at work, however, or where their employment is so 
precarious the worker does not see any alternative, the decision may not 
appear to exist at all: Continue work. Be quiet. Keep your head down. 
Don't get fired or not called back. Loss of income. Unemployment. Ruin. 
For millions of workers around the world the choice is simple: hazard or 
hardship. 
The right to refuse unsafe work is a global policy question that con-
fronts all nations. Around the world, every society and government must 
decide how to protect, or not to protect, each worker from retaliation and 
termination. This involves not just drafting a progressive antidiscrimina-
tion law; it also involves the regulating of work and employment relations 
on a more fundamental level. Each country defines the rights of workers 
differently, but each national labor policy rests on a framework of laws 
and regulations that defines how workers who refuse work for reasons of 
safety and health will be treated. This "individual" decision by workers is 
thus an individual decision that is the result of a larger social process. The 
larger social process, namely how a nation writes laws and structures its 
business and employment systems, is found in every country of the world. 
From the social democracies of northern Europe and the informal work-
places of Africa, to the immense factories of East Asia and the export pro-
cessing zones of Central America, to the vast agribusiness farmlands and 
the declining industrial towns across North America, individual worker 
decisions are encased in a broader institutional framework regulating each 
society's economies. 
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The right to refuse unsafe work—silently contemplated or actively en-
gaged in—is ultimately a moral question for society. It is the worker that 
must face the greatest burden of occupational injuries and illnesses. If soci-
ety crafts institutions, laws, and regulations that expose workers to hostile 
supervisors and managers without effective recourse, a moral choice has 
been made. Such a moral choice finds it acceptable that workers are forced 
to choose between two unthinkable alternatives: their physical health and 
safety or their economic livelihood and basic subsistence. Under this type 
of moral system, laws and regulations make a worker's safety and health 
nothing more than a commodity to be bought and sold for a price. Where 
a society offers no means of protecting the right to refuse unsafe work, 
workers themselves hold no more standing than their monetary value to 
the company. Here, workers are commodities. Health and safety—and 
thus the worker—become marketable commodities to be sold for a profit 
while workers assume the private burden of "their" injuries and illnesses. 
The problem with this moral choice is that human beings are not com-
modities; human beings—people—are not mere objects to be bought and 
sold in a marketplace. Each human being has intrinsic worth. Slavery is 
widely seen as an affront to morality; slave markets have become prohib-
ited institutions. As the question has become buying worker health and 
safety versus the whole human being, this moral logic, somehow, breaks 
down. The rights of workers in a globalized economy, especially those 
rights that protect safety and health, are limited. The "modern" impera-
tive gives a higher priority to ongoing production, the authority of corpo-
rations, and making a profit. Despite weak systems of workplace rights, 
however, the underlying moral dilemma remains unchanged: if human 
beings as workers do not have the right to refuse unsafe work, they are 
nothing more than a commodity upon a global stage. 
Labor Is N o t a Commodity 
At the dawn of the modern human rights era, after the wreckage of the 
Second World War, the idea that a worker is not a commodity was rec-
ognized and accepted internationally. Founded in 1919, the International 
Labor Organization was reconstituted through the Declaration of Phil-
adelphia, adopted in 1944. "Labor is not a commodity" became the first 
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fundamental principle of the ILO. This was followed with the solemn ob-
ligation to advance policies and programs to achieve "adequate protection 
for the life and health of all workers in all occupations." The ILO had, 
since its beginning, served as a global forum for the negotiation and su-
pervision of treaties on labor standards. The new Declaration of Philadel-
phia was an international recognition that "labor was not a commodity" 
and connected this principle to the aim of improving working conditions. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt remarked at the time how the new declaration 
"was an historical document on a level with the U.S. Declaration of Inde-
pendence in 1776."16 The text "sums up the aspirations of an epoch," the 
U.S. president noted, "affirming the rights of all human beings to material 
well-being and spiritual development under conditions of freedom and 
dignity." He implored "attainment of those conditions must constitute a 
central aim of national and international policy." "Indeed," he concluded, 
"the worthiness and success of international policies will be measured in 
the future by the extent to which they promote the achievement of this 
end."17 
That labor was not a commodity had gained acceptance in the postwar 
years of social protection. Although "labor market" as a phrase was ap-
plied to systems of work and employment—a place where "buyers" and 
"sellers" exchange work and pay for a price—all were not in agreement 
with this metaphor. Notable writers such as Karl Polanyi18 described labor 
as a fictitious commodity. The economy was organized by institutions that 
enforced labor's unnatural commodification. Labor as a fictitious com-
modity was contrasted with genuine commodities such as basic material 
goods. Polanyi and others argued that new institutions could be built to 
provide social protection, enough social protection to decommodify labor 
and employment. This decommodification required knowledge of institu-
tions. As the Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang later noted, following 
Polanyi's logic, economics was itself the study of institutions and how the 
various institutions constitute "rights-obligation structures" throughout an 
economy.19 
In the decades after the Declaration of Philadelphia was adopted at its 
twenty-sixth general conference, the ILO advocated labor and social poli-
cies for a postwar world based in social justice. The ILO was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1969 in part for the idea Si vis pacem, cole justitiam— 
if the world is to achieve peace, it must cultivate justice. Led by a tripartite 
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(unions, employers, and governments) system of decision-making, the 
ILO directed its actions at the formalized and predominantly male labor 
force. This focus was critiqued but would remain amid a backdrop of "re-
duced labor-based inequality" in the 1960s. Social justice required direct 
engagement with employment relations and macroeconomic planning. 
The ILO led the effort to transform the principle of labor, decommodi-
fied, into reality.20 
The ILO's social justice efforts in the postwar decades were most in-
novative in the work of the World Employment Program of the 1960s and 
1970s. Recognizing global economic disparities, the WEP advocated poli-
cies seeking full employment and a human needs-based model of economic 
development. This required creating diverse state interventions beyond 
classic market-based policy. The ILO's W E P advocated redistribution 
and broad national economic planning. At one point, ILO experts were 
assisting national governments in developing five-year plans. Through 
the 1960s and early 1970s, a global macroeconomic alternative had even 
emerged in response to neoliberalism's "failed policies of the counter-
revolution." Such strategies eventually met the ire of U.S. government lead-
ers, U.S. trade union leaders, and employers from both the United States 
and Europe. Each of these key national and social actors voted against the 
W E P agenda when the issue came to a head at the World Employment 
Conference in 1975.21 
The 1970s and 1980s was a period of "intellectual shrinkage" for the 
ILO. The United States stopped its dues contributions to the ILO in 1970, 
suspending its membership in November 1975. Various reasons were 
given for the U.S. withdrawal, but the most direct impact on the ILO was 
an immediate reduction on the annual ILO budget: 
The strident letter sent by Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State, to the 
Director-General was in fact written by Harvard Professor John Dunlop, 
the doyen of American industrial relations theorists. The suspension cre-
ated immediate difficulties for the ILO, since the USA, which contributed 
a quarter of the ILO's regular budget, had also failed to pay its huge back-
log of financial dues.22 
As globalization and the decline of industrial unionism challenged the 
ILO's tripartite governance, the U.S. withdrawal placed the ILO on the 
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defensive. The ILO offered no response to the World Bank's structural ad-
justment strategies that proposed "a dismantling of protective regulations 
and a substitution of pro-individualistic, pro-market regulations." The 
labor market flexibility debate grew yet when the ILO had "came up with 
evidence of the adverse effects of the new pro-market policies, efforts were 
made to keep it quiet to avoid alienating key governments," especially key 
states that were promoting neoliberal reforms. Intellectual shrinkage after 
1980 meant the pace of standard setting would slow, the content of labor 
conventions would become more voluntarist and favorable to employers, 
and ILO supervision would be weakened.23 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the spread of capitalism cre-
ated a new opportunity for the ILO. The World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) all challenged the historic ILO role of institution-
building for social justice. Popular unrest would keep social justice afloat 
yet pro-market critics argued against the "proliferation" of labor conven-
tions.24 One of the ILO's post-Cold War responses was The Declaration 
of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Wor\, a statement that defined 
four "core" issues as fundamental rights. These included the right to free-
dom from forced labor, the right to freedom from child labor, the right to 
equality and freedom from discrimination, and the freedom of association. 
What was lost, aside from work safety and health listed as a fundamen-
tal right, was a more expansive consciousness of the ILO as a forum for 
advancing broader systems of institutional governance through labor and 
social policy, not just silos of particular rights at work. 
Today, the ILO estimates about 2.3 million workers are killed by work-
related injuries and illnesses annually25 and the figure is not declining.26 
Another 270 million nonfatal work-related accidents occur annually, in 
addition to about 160 million new cases of work-related disease identified 
each year.27 Global capitalism today exacts an incalculable human toll on 
society and the planet. The financial toll is estimated to be between 2 to 11 
percent of gross domestic product, stark figures that if halved would in 
some countries eliminate all foreign debt.28 The reality that work-related 
illnesses and injuries have become a leading cause of adult morbidity is 
the tragic backdrop to the strategic weakening of the ILO over the last 
generation.29 More people are killed at work today than by warfare. Work-
ers' rights continue to be challenged not only by a hypercompetitive global 
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economy but also by increasingly precarious work arrangements and the 
failure to address the many new economic realities challenging human 
rights at work. 
Complicating this picture today is how occupational health and safety 
hazards have become more complex. The "old" occupational health prob-
lems such as cotton dust and brown lung have resurfaced in areas of the 
world with weak governance and regulation—forcing workers "to replay 
history, despite the availability of information and knowledge transfer 
unthinkable just a generation ago."30 New varieties of workplace hazards 
are also emerging. This includes the explosion of new synthetic chemicals 
and their global trade. Whereas health hazards such as asbestos, lead, and 
white phosphorus were once the most serious causes for alarm, now one 
thousand new synthetic chemicals—two to three per day—are introduced 
into the global marketplace every year, bringing the number of synthetic 
chemicals in use to over one hundred thousand and growing. Other types 
of occupational hazards unknown a few years ago include occupational 
risks from products manufactured with nanoparticles, genetically engi-
neered organisms of one variety or another, a list of hazards related to 
climate change, and workplace-based social hazards such as violence, psy-
chological trauma, and mental health issues. 
How workers are empowered (or not empowered) by society to protect 
health and safety is a central question in labor and employment policy. 
With the weakening of the international response through the ILO, work-
ers are placed at risk and bear the burden of weak institutional protec-
tions. The typical response, when safety and health receives attention, is 
to strengthen the classic labor inspection model. As new hazards emerge 
while regulatory regimes often remain captured by business, however, new 
strategies are needed in response. Returning the question of occupational 
safety and health to the realm of workers' rights and the role of labor rights 
in the working environment is a step of fundamental importance for labor 
policymakers and workers at risk worldwide. 
This reexamination requires studying the institutions of worker repre-
sentation and governance in the working environment. This study focuses 
on one dimension of worker representation, the right to refuse unsafe 
work. Among the characteristics that define commodified labor is that 
management holds the institutional freedom to hire, fire, and exert control 
over workers. Gradations of this freedom exist across different societies, 
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but the freedom remains. The O E C D summarizes employment dismissal 
protections for all member states and the Anglo-American countries top 
the list in the freedom to dismiss workers. The United States, with its em-
ployment at-will doctrines, ranks first among O E C D member countries, 
with Canada and the United Kingdom claiming the second and third most 
"flexible" labor market policies on dismissal protection.31 
Refusal rights law defines both the rights of workers as well as the 
termination freedoms held by employers. Just as some societies limit em-
ployers' right to dismiss employees on grounds such as racial or gender dis-
crimination, employee dissent and the right to refuse unsafe work forms 
a similar moral limit on the termination of the employment relationship. 
Labor policy in general—the body of laws and regulations controlling 
work and workers—is the vehicle whereby such moral imperatives are 
implemented. Labor policies are found in every society. 
Where employers hold liberal freedoms of termination, refusal rights 
become rights that are very difficult to exercise and enjoy. Oftentimes 
labor policies turn the right to refuse into a case of employee disloyalty 
and insubordination, placing additional burdens of proof upon the worker. 
Where workplaces confront a globally competitive environment, or where 
work itself is organized in a precarious fashion, seemingly insurmountable 
burdens are placed upon workers exercising the right to refuse. Yet the 
right to refuse unsafe work may be the most empowering way that work-
ers represent themselves on the question of health and safety in the work-
ing environment and remains a ubiquitous question across workplace 
relations. This book details how workers lost the right to refuse under in-
ternational labor and human rights norms. It is an in-depth look at how 
our global society has decided to resolve—and failed to resolve—the pro-
tection of any fundamental human right to refuse unsafe work. 
1 
H U M A N RIGHTS AND THE STRUGGLE TO 
D E F I N E HAZARDS 
Protecting basic refusal rights where workers face the most dangerous 
working conditions has had wide public support generally. Definitions of 
workplace hazards, however, are socially contested; meaning workers and 
employers often disagree about the definition of workplace hazards. The 
right to refuse typically has been wedded to some threshold, defined le-
gally, that describes the degree of occupational hazard a worker may re-
fuse. The phrase "imminent and serious danger" is one such legal standard 
that is used to determine when a worker can refuse unsafe work. 
One can argue over the specific hazard threshold that will be covered 
by the right to refuse. At a more fundamental level, however, is the ques-
tion of who should have the right to define hazardous work in the first place. 
The typical decision makers are the legislators, regulators, and ultimately 
judges. An alternative view is that the workers themselves should be the 
ones to decide. Many people have a visceral negative reaction to the idea 
that a single worker should be empowered to define the very nature of a 
workplace hazard to which they are exposed. It runs counter to a host of 
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deeply held values. This is especially the case in the United States, where 
worker commodification is the norm in law. Arguments against this 
worker freedom range from an objectivism rooted in scientific rational-
ity to the view that workers are not capable of making such important 
decisions. Indeed, the scientific infrastructure erected around occupational 
safety and health in the last generation plays into a basic logic that a tech-
nocratic view has the capacity to solve all health and safety concerns. This 
perspective also views power relations at the workplace as less important, 
believing instead that if objective science can identify a hazard to human 
health, a broad social consensus necessarily follows in response. 
Labor history is instructive on this point. Where commodification is 
strongest, as in Anglo-American countries, workers have struggled to re-
fuse unsafe work on their own terms and according to their own defini-
tions of hazardous work. Workers have held a different idea about the 
right to refuse unsafe work compared to not only employers but to pro-
gressive policymakers, regulators, and judges. The struggle for the right 
to define the nature of a hazard has, therefore, been as much a struggle 
as have those against particular hazards. These are two sides of the same 
coin, indivisible throughout labor history. In recounting this rich heritage, 
I open the debate about who gets to decide the nature of a hazard and 
thus when society protects the right to refuse. Although the aim of this 
book is a detailed examination of international labor rights norms, I use 
Anglo-American labor history to elucidate this key question underlying 
the global debate, namely, who decides the definition of a hazard at work? 
Empowerment to Define Hazards at Work 
As a subject of struggle by unions in collective bargaining, the right to 
refuse was protected as early as the Jellico Agreement of 1893, which 
covered eight Appalachian mines and was at the time "one of the most 
advanced agreements of any miners in the country." It allowed a miner 
"to refuse to work if he thought the mine was dangerous through fail-
ure of the bosses to supply enough support timber."1 James Grey Pope has 
called conflicts where workers had unique ideas about their rights constitu-
tional insurgencies} Militant strikes by miners in the 1920s clashed with the 
Kansas Industrial Court, an early U.S. experiment in industrial relations 
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law. Progressive middle-class reformers maintained that "constitutional 
rights in the economic sphere blocked adaptation to change" and strikes 
"amounted to 'industrial warfare' that should give way to peaceful ad-
ministration" as fundamental principles "interfered with pragmatic bar-
gaining."3 The miners disagreed, as did other workers. Quoting Carter 
Goodrich's The Miner's Freedom, these workers were active self-advocates: 
They develop informal rules governing such matters as the distribution of 
coal cars, the 'proprietary' rights of the miner to his own space on the seam, 
and the principle that a man 'ought to know when he is tired' and therefore 
decide for himself when the working day is done... . Violations of the code 
were adjudicated and punished by co-workers, applying sanctions rang-
ing from sour comments to ostracism and, occasionally, physical assault. At 
the core of the most successful, pioneering industrial unions were groups of 
workers with especially strong traditions of informal jurisgenerative prac-
tice: Deep shaft miners in the United Mine Workers, tire builders in the 
United Rubber Workers, and the skilled metal trades in the United Auto-
mobile Workers.4 
This "effective freedom" originated from a "popular rights consciousness" 
that was distinct from the prevailing legal norms, labor's professional legal 
representation, the business community, and Progressives who sought to 
advance their own politics. 
After the enactment of the U.S. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 
(the Wagner Act) and adoption of Wagner Act principles in Canada in the 
1940s, the right to refuse unsafe work gained ground as a viable subject 
of collective bargaining in North America. Collective labor agreements 
would become the only way to circumvent the strict common laws on the 
termination of employment that had commodified workers in the United 
States and Canada. Refusal rights were not effectively enforced before 
agreements with labor unions and the passage of new labor laws that fa-
cilitated collective bargaining.5 
By the 1960s and early 1970s, collective bargaining had strengthened 
the right to refuse in the United States and Canada. Some labor arbitra-
tors—although not all—had stepped back from a "work now, grieve later" 
standard, often with the aid of explicit contractual language protecting 
the right to refuse. Just cause termination in labor agreements also al-
tered the common-law rules for terminating employment, affording more 
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protection to workers refusing unsafe work. These trends did not extend 
the right to refuse to all, but they did protect against liberal discharge 
norms for millions covered by collective agreements. 
How collective bargaining affected the right to refuse unsafe work is 
seen in the breadth of these protections. In a survey from the early 1970s of 
1,724 labor agreements, each covering more than one thousand workers, 
health and safety was addressed in 93 percent of the agreements. Agree-
ments covering over 1.9 million employees recognized "the right to refuse 
to work under unsafe conditions or to demand being relieved from the job 
under such circumstances." A smaller group of agreements gave the union 
the authority "to remove a person from the job."6 
Canadian provincial labor law began requiring that collective bargain-
ing agreements include clauses that discipline could only be for just cause.7 
Canadian labor arbitrators slowly were becoming more and more com-
fortable with independently using the language available within a labor 
agreement to protect a worker's right to refuse unsafe work: 
A more expansive right to refuse unsafe work has been fashioned by arbi-
trators from several basic elements of the law of collective bargaining. . . . 
Arbitrators are empowered to reinstate an employee who has been wrong-
fully discharged, to award back pay and to substitute a lesser penalty for 
the one imposed by management. Shaping this legal raw material into an 
elementary right to refuse was an easy task. Disobeying an order, even an 
improper one, is generally cause for discipline. An employee must comply 
with the maxim "work now, grieve later," because the grievance and arbi-
tration process, not the shop floor, is the preferred forum for dispute reso-
lution. A refusal to perform unsafe work is recognized as an exception to 
this rule.8 
The first published arbitration decision in Canada to recognize the re-
fusal exception to the "work now, grieve later" standard was in 1963 in 
B.A. Oil Company.9 The leading case after this jurisprudence became Steel 
Company of Canada in 1974, a case that was cited favorably throughout 
the 1970s.10 Some Canadian arbitrators at the time adopted an undue im-
minent hazard standard. More conservative arbitrators used as a yardstick 
"risks which are normal for a grievor's workplace" and gave those risks 
"the arbitrator's stamp of approval."" As Richard Brown noted, with Steel 
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Company and other decisions labor arbitrators exercised more discretion in 
protecting workers against health and safety discrimination: 
Blind acquiescence in risks normally associated with a job is wrong because 
the production process is largely controlled by management with little input 
from workers. In addition, the practice of a single employer may fall below 
industry standards. The Steel Company award recognized the danger of re-
lying exclusively upon management's judgment and found that a proce-
dure which had been consistently followed by a foreman was not acceptably 
safe. The grievor had been instructed to use a poker to dislodge debris over-
head, but had refused when a falling brick struck his partner's arm. After 
the grievor was suspended, the other members of his crew were taken to 
the roof to complete the task from that location with the aid of extensions 
on their pokers. The arbitrator's conclusion that a danger existed was sup-
ported by evidence that a safer procedure was possible . . . and that a minor 
injury had occurred.12 
Such arbitration decisions posed threats to the common law and, there-
fore, threatened management control of the workplace. Labor arbitration 
moved the right to refuse toward what could be called a basic "status pro-
tection" for workers, where the exercise of the right to refuse could be 
enjoyed based on the class status of being a worker in an employment re-
lationship. The assessment of risk in Canadian arbitration was interpreted 
based on an arbitrator's judgment and not a legislator's interpretation of 
hazards at work. Arbitration decisions were imperfect and still focused on 
the evaluation of the hazard that workers faced before protection against 
termination was granted, but they represented a new and important trend 
to protect the right to refuse. Arbitral labor jurisprudence was in one sense 
becoming a more effective protection of worker refusal rights. This trend 
was more pronounced in Canada than in the United States, where arbitra-
tor values also continued to treat refusal cases as basic employee insubor-
dination cases.13 
Although important, arbitration had its limits. As a general rule, ar-
bitral jurisprudence places the burden of establishing the justification for 
discipline on the management. In cases of the right to refuse unsafe work 
at arbitration, however, an employer "need only prove disobedience before 
an employee is called upon to show that a refusal to work was proper in the 
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circumstances."14 Rarely was the management called upon to demonstrate 
that the work was safe for the worker as a justification for an insubordina-
tion charge. 
By the 1970s, a substantial North American jurisprudence had devel-
oped. This jurisprudence, although it did not always protect the right to 
refuse, at least attested to what could be called a radical consciousness of 
health and safety held by workers and their organizations. Not bound by a 
narrow conceptualization of occupational safety and health, worker activ-
ists held unique interpretations of safety and attempted to exercise refusal 
rights while at the same time negotiating for improved workplace gover-
nance. Between 1966 and 1975, safety related work stoppages grew by 385 
percent in the United States while the overall rate of stoppages increased 
more slowly, from 14 percent to 38 percent of all work stoppages in the 
base year of 1966.V5 Labor conflict over health and safety was on the rise, 
and unions were becoming an outlet for environmental health and safety 
concerns. 
Across North America, health and safety emerged a top issue in col-
lective bargaining as labor inspectorates were failing in their mission to 
protect workers from hazards. Unions chided the U.S. health and safety 
inspectorate for "attitudes that show a priority compassion for the prob-
lems and inconveniences of management."16 One O S H A official re-
sponded positively to displeasure from labor and management. "Since the 
criticism of the OSHA program is about equal from all sides," he said, "we 
are probably steering a right course toward accomplishing the objectives 
of the act."17 
A team of labor researchers observed that this odd reaction from early 
OSHA leaders implied "the [OSHA] mission is to find a middle ground in 
an area of class conflict, rather than to achieve a working environment free 
from recognized hazards."18 
Even as OSHA came into force in the United States in 1971, union col-
lective bargaining provided the only effective means by which workers 
held a voice in their working environment. It was thought that OSHA 
would protect workers better than decentralized collective bargaining, 
but even though the new agency did raise the profile of safety and health, 
which was at times helpful in bargaining, it was quickly disappointing for 
labor. It would take no longer than the first OSHA labor complaint to 
shatter any illusions. 
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Allied Chemical employed two hundred members of Local Union 
3-586 of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers at a plant in Mounds-
ville, West Virginia. Charges of widespread mercury contamination, in-
cluding mercury seeping through the cracked floors, were forwarded to 
state health officials after plant managers refused to meet a union health 
and safety committee to discuss the problem. Inspectors from the West 
Virginia Department of Health confirmed the contamination in February 
1971 and in March a Walsh-Healy federal contractor health inspection also 
justified the workers' concerns. Allied Chemical openly contested the find-
ings. One month after OSHA became law, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic 
Workers acted on behalf of their local affiliate and made history with the 
first OSHA complaint. 
The O S H A inspection failed to order the immediate abatement of the 
mercury contamination. The Labor Department ruled that health hazards 
were not to be considered "imminent dangers" under the Act, despite a 
clear legislative intention otherwise and evidence from a survey collected 
at the time of the O S H A inspection that revealed 67 percent of workers 
were experiencing signs of mercury poisoning. Two weeks later, OSHA 
issued its first citation in history to the Allied Chemical Company, fining 
it $1,000 and issuing a lengthy, nonbinding cleanup order. The company 
paid the fine to OSHA and made no legal appeal. The lessons from the first 
OSHA citation were later chronicled as an historic "first" in several ways, 
revealing "how the government would respond to complaints about health 
h a z a r d s . . . and how it defined 'imminent danger'."19 
Labor unions argued that worker health and safety could be protected 
only when workers are empowered. "The question becomes one of power," 
noted the health and safety activist Tony Mazzocchi of OCAW on the need 
for labor rights. "Those workers who are the potential victims ought to 
regulate. . . . It should be the worker who carries out the mandate of the 
law, the right to inspect, the right to cite, the right to bring about change 
based on what is known, the right to be notified, the right to know." Only 
by thinking of the subject "in terms of empowerment" could a difference 
be made.20 
That OSHA was to take a "hands-off" approach to regulation was evi-
dent when M I T professor Nicolas Ashford interviewed the first leaders 
of OSHA and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH), the new federal agencies established by the U.S. Congress. 
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Marcus Key, director of NIOSH, and George Guenther, the first assistant 
secretary of labor for occupational safety and health, voiced strong agree-
ment with the sweeping new findings of the Robens Committee. The Ro-
bens Committee's high-profile parliamentary inquiry into worker health 
and safety policy in Britain had argued for fewer legal restrictions on busi-
ness and advocated partial voluntary self-regulation of worker health and 
safety. Key summarized the principles of the Robens Report in a speech to 
the American Public Health Association in 1972, noting curtly that "not all 
problems can be solved 'by the strict language of a standard'" before he rec-
ommended flexibility in developing worker health and safety standards.21 
In remarks at the Kennedy School of Government that would fore-
shadow later debates on worker health and safety at the ILO, George 
Guenther said the new OSHA should follow the underlying values em-
bodied in the Robens Report. Ashford reported: 
George Guenther, former Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational 
Safety and Health, agreed with the appropriateness for the United States of 
the following Robens Report conclusions: (1) there is too much law; (2) the 
law is not relevant to the workers' situation; (3) the various administrative 
agencies are unnecessarily fragmented. It should be remembered, though, 
that it is the British system that is characterized by fragmented legislation; 
this is not the case in the United States. Guenther was misusing the Robens 
Committee's observation that 'there is too much law' to justify not develop-
ing regulations.22 
Guenther made these comments less than two years after OSHA's en-
actment, giving little credibility to his argument, which criticized OSHA's 
work when the agency was barely up and running. Voluntary compliance 
was the mantra from day one of OSHA. The values and the belief system 
behind this "total operating philosophy"23 were likely lost on the people 
showing signs of mercury poisoning who were working at the Allied 
Chemical Company's plant in Moundsville, West Virginia. 
Business Wee\ reported that unions had become increasingly concerned 
about the working environment, especially hazards that caused disease. 
"Unions heretofore never dreamt that such situations might exist," noted 
George Taylor, director of occupational health and safety for the AFL-
CIO.24 "Everybody is being forced into looking at this question," said Maz-
zocchi. "If you critically examine what each union does, you see that people 
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are at different places. But they are in motion, whether it is a hard run or 
a walk."25 Likewise, a number of collective bargaining agreement gains 
in the 1970s addressed the working environment and out-of-plant envi-
ronmental damage. These efforts placed workers and their unions in a 
position of contesting the nature of production itself with an increasingly 
sympathetic public willing to legitimize new environmental labor rights.26 
Collective Bargaining for the Working Environment 
Safety and health in the working environment became more important to 
the collective bargaining of a number of major unions in this period, in-
cluding the United Auto Workers, OCAW, the United Farm Workers, the 
United Mine Workers, and to a degree the United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica. An entirely different conception of safety and health in the working 
environment was emerging and being advocated by workers directly. 
After holding union conferences around the country entitled "Hazards 
in the Industrial Environment" in 1969 and 1970, OCAW surveyed 508 local 
unions on safety, health, and environmental concerns. The UAW surveyed 
over four hundred local unions. Fifty-nine percent of the local unions knew 
their workplaces were contributing to air, water, and land pollution, in-
cluding 79 percent of those with over one thousand members. Thirty-seven 
percent reported members being assigned job tasks resulting in air or water 
pollution, including nearly half of the locals with a thousand or more mem-
bers.27 These concerns would be prominent in labor campaigns in subsequent 
years and demonstrated how effective an in-plant local system of collective 
bargaining was in raising the issue of hazards and in advocating change. 
One of the first conferences organized by labor and environmental 
groups, the Urban Environment Conference of 1971, allowed urban re-
form groups, environmental groups and advocates, and organized labor 
to meet and work together to protect on-the-job and community health.28 
This was part of a broad-based movement with labor union activism at 
center stage. Labor unions, however, would find themselves in the unfa-
vorable position of leading a budding social movement while ensconced 
within a weak collective bargaining and labor law system that provided 
little strategic leverage for what were fast becoming major structural chal-
lenges from economic globalization. 
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Collective bargaining, despite passage of the law authorizing OSHA in 
1970, continued to be the vehicle affording workers the most protection 
when shop floor resistance to worksite environmental damage occurred. A 
good example is the refusal of Gilbert Pugliese at the Jones and Laughlin 
Steel facility in Cleveland. Pugliese "refused to push a button" to rush hun-
dreds of gallons of oil into the Cuyahoga River. He was suspended for five 
days while his supervisors considered permanent suspension but decided 
against it in consideration of a revolt of the workers. Two years later, with 
OSHA in operation, a company foreman again insisted that Pugliese push 
the button. Local media embarrassed the USWA into fighting his impend-
ing discharge for insubordination. Pugliese kept the job he had held for 
eighteen years and the Jones and Laughlin Steel Company was forced to 
find alternative means to dispose of the Cleveland plant's waste oil apart 
from their practice of dumping it into the Cuyahoga River and the Lake 
Erie watershed.29 
It was collective bargaining that afforded protection against insubordi-
nation charges; OSHA had ignored the right to refuse. Protection against 
"imminent danger" was left in the statute but did not explicitly enable any 
refusal rights. This would be a topic for later regulatory rulemaking. The 
best protection of the right to refuse would be protections from at-will em-
ployment through a collectively bargained just clause contract provision. 
As with Gilbert Pugliese, for many there was but little difference between 
the legal right to refuse unsafe hazards at work and an unsafe hazard at 
work that would later damage a community's environment. 
Although self-interest of a sort could characterize such claims, the ac-
tions of many workers at the time also represented a much broader set of 
values that could not fully be described as simply self-interested; at times, 
they held a stronger moral dimension. Political expedience at a time of 
growing ecological consciousness may have been the case in some bargain-
ing relationships, but this does not by itself disqualify the moral dimension 
of this labor activism, especially with the growing backdrop of precarious 
employment relations under increasingly competitive globalization. 
Numerous cases can be found across North America illustrating how 
workers struggled to expand the definition of unsafe and hazardous work. 
Health and safety issues figured prominently in the sixty-seven day strike 
against General Motors in 1970. Management at forty plants agreed to 
nearly two thousand worker demands on health and safety, over one-third 
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of which addressed "onerous, dangerous" and "uncomfortable" conditions 
in the plant environment30 Better ventilation, reductions in noise pollu-
tion, and the removal of oil and debris from factory floors were among the 
gains. This did not change the polluting automobile (changes that were 
advocated in bargaining), but these proposals advanced by workers and 
agreed to by management resulted in immediate environmental improve-
ments through collective bargaining.31 
OCAW was prepared for a prolonged confrontation for health and 
safety committees in the 1972 negotiations with leading U.S. oil produc-
ers. Labor's demand was "the right of workers to control, at least as deci-
sively as their employer, the health and safety conditions in the factories 
and shops."32 A nationwide industrial confrontation was averted when the 
American Oil Company agreed to the demands. By January 1973 twelve 
of the fourteen major oil companies accepted similar terms. The campaign 
then turned to Shell Oil Company, a holdout. Shell workers walked off 
the job and launched a national boycott of Shell Oil in what newspapers 
called "the first time in American labor history a major strike has started 
over the potential health hazards of an industry."33 Nearly every major 
environmental group supported the strike, including the Sierra Club. En-
vironmentalists began to study labor relations, with detailed strike news 
appearing in scientific journals such as Science: 
The strike is about a health and safety clause in a new, 2-year contract cover-
ing some 5,000 OCAW workers; it has already been accepted by more than 
15 other oil companies. The clause would establish a joint labor management 
committee, with each side equally represented, to approve outside surveys of 
health and safety conditions in the plant, make public reports, recommend 
medical examinations where necessary, and determine what changes should 
be made if hazards are found to exist. Should disputes arise within the com-
mittee, normal grievance and arbitration procedures can be followed. Barry 
Commoner, of Washington University in St. Louis, regards the clause as 
highly significant. "By working for environmental quality at the workplace, 
and developing new ways to improve it, these joint committees will help 
control environmental pollution at its source," Commoner has said.34 
What was happening was the development of a broad-based coalition 
where workers' freedom of association and collective bargaining were 
paired with and at the center of a cross-class movement to regulate the 
